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PREFACE 
fter decades of hesitation, EU member states have started to realise the possible 
benefits or even the need for a more integrated EU energy policy. New challenges, 
notably climate change, but also the resurfacing of old ones such as security of 
supply or the need to face up to increasing global competition, have triggered this new 
thinking. The first-generation EU energy policy remains schematic and will continue to be so 
for the time being. Now that agreement has been reached on the principle, additional steps 
will be needed to identify what can and should be done at EU level and what is best dealt 
with by member states.  
Against this background, CEPS has launched a Task Force that has brought together a 
broad range of stakeholders, including senior executives from numerous different industries, 
e.g. energy production and supply companies, energy-intensive industries and service 
companies, and representatives from business associations and non-governmental 
environmental organisations. The members of the Task Force engaged in extensive debates 
in the course of several meetings. During these meetings, the Task Force members had ample 
opportunity to enter into discussion and to exchange views with senior officials from the EU 
institutions and international organisations. 
This CEPS Task Force Report has been designed as a general reflection on the added-
valueof an EU energy policy. While identifying the main direction and principles of the new 
EU energy policy, the report looks to future priorities and highlights key measures that will 
be crucial for a successful energy policy for Europe.  
I want to thank the members of the Task Force for their active and positive 
contributions throughout the meetings. Although each member endorses the general content 
of the report, one should not conclude that all members subscribe to every sentence of the 
text.  
 
 
 
Knud Pedersen 
Chairman of the CEPS Task Force 
Vice President, DONG Energy S/A 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he European Union’s debate on energy policy has entered a new and crucial stage. 
Since the adoption of a new integrated EU climate and energy policy at the European 
Council of 8 and 9 March 2007, the European Commission has tabled various 
proposals for its implementation, the most recent on 23 January 2008. These proposals are 
critical in further shaping the emerging contours of this new energy policy for Europe, which 
aims to address Europe’s three main energy policy challenges: to combat climate change and 
guarantee security of energy supply while ensuring the competitiveness of European 
industries.  
This CEPS Task Force Report contributes to the emerging contours of this new ‘first-
generation’ EU energy policy. Its purpose is two-fold: i) to identify those policy areas that are 
expected to benefit most from deeper EU integration, i.e. where the European ‘added-value’ 
is expected to be biggest, and ii) to formulate recommendations on how such integration 
could be achieved in practice.  
The report is organised as follows. The Executive Summary with Key Messages and 
Recommendations is followed by 7 sections. The first two sections set out EU energy policy 
challenges and identify possible areas where European ‘added-value’ is the greatest. Section 
3 introduces the concept of robustness and lays out the need for energy policy indicators. 
Section 4 analyses the external dimension of a European energy policy, before sections 5 and 
6 examine costs and benefits and strategies for cost-minimisation. Finally, section 7 identifies 
the ‘added-value’ on the concrete example of renewable energy sources. A list of members of 
the Task Force can be found in Annex 2. 
I.  Key Messages 
Elements of a ‘first-generation’ EU energy policy 
1.  On balance, the new integrated EU climate and energy policy as proposed by the 
European Commission and endorsed by the European Council is a visionary and yet 
realistic approach for dealing with EU energy policy challenges. It points in the right 
direction to what is to become a ‘first-generation’ EU energy policy. However, a 
principal challenge is to identify the EU’s ‘added-value’ and to specify how to adapt 
EU tools, policies and institutions accordingly, in the absence of comprehensive EU 
energy policy competencies. The agreement on the Lisbon Treaty, including new EU 
competencies on energy policy, adds a new dynamic as this establishes for the first 
time an energy chapter and streamlines decision-making.  
2.  This report has identified four priority areas where the EU’s added-value has the 
greatest potential: 
•  Complete the internal energy market with adequate policy harmonisation, 
•  Develop a ‘European concept for security of supply’, including better policy 
coherence, 
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•  Build stronger external energy policy capability and 
•  Push the development and deployment of energy technologies.  
These four priorities can be reinforced by EU collection and interpretation of 
information and data, and complemented by institutional adaptation. Finally, the 
report puts the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) and renewables policies to the test 
against the new integrated EU climate and energy policy.  
3.  The report finds also that a critical element for this added-value to materialise will be 
policy coherence, especially between the internal energy market and national policies. 
There is currently no mechanism to ensure a systematic assessment of impacts of 
national energy policies and measures on the EU. More coherence between EU and 
member state policies could be expected if the European Commission develops a 
number of (energy policy) indicators against which to benchmark member states’ 
policies in the context of the Strategic EU Energy Review. In order to be effective, such 
an assessment would almost certainly need to be made ex-ante, which would mean 
some sort of advance consultation by member states, if not notification to the European 
Commission.  
Reaping the benefits of the internal energy market  
4.  An effective internal market for energy is a necessary precondition for EU energy 
policy objectives. It provides a stable and predictable regulatory framework designed 
for equal opportunities and equal treatment of all market participants. It increases 
efficiency of the sector while bringing down costs of goods and services by better 
resource allocation while internationally increasing the economic and political weight 
of the EU and its member states. At the same time, it will minimise the costs of the EU’s 
ambitious policy targets. A well-functioning internal market is also a strong base on 
which to develop robust trade relations, thereby turning dependency into 
interdependency. This includes, among others, effective unbundling, cooperation of 
independent national regulators and competition policy and the development of cross-
border trade and regional markets. The European Commission’s proposal of 19 
September 2007 to strengthen existing internal market provisions is an important step 
towards a better functioning internal market and improved competitiveness. Better 
infrastructure, more competition and new entrants will increase the efficiency of the 
market. Long-term contracts can help to improve infrastructure and competition, 
provided the different parts of the energy value chain, production, transportation, 
wholesale markets, distribution and supply are efficient and free of distortions. It is 
important that the revised ETS and the renewable energy sources (RES) Directive are in 
line with the 3rd liberalisation package, enabling Europe to reap the benefits of the 
internal energy market.  
A European concept for security of supply  
5.  Member state policies to secure energy needs are increasingly influenced by EU 
policies, such as on energy market liberalisation, renewables or emissions trading. At 
the same time, national responses to security of supply may partly be incompatible 
with the security of supply interests of other member states or the EU as a whole. Such 
inconsistencies can be overcome by a ‘European concept for security of supply’. This 
concept could include tools to ensure policy coherence (e.g. energy policy indicators), 
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with supply disruptions (e.g. solidarity obligations). A European concept of security of 
supply would also need to include EU-wide policy measures to address typical market 
failures, i.e. i) long-term technology development, demonstration and deployment of 
breakthrough energy technologies; ii) energy efficiency in domestic sector; iii) 
consumer behaviour; and iv) possible risks to energy security. Such a concept would 
need to take into account that the EU is largely dependent on imports from regions 
where market forces do not work and economic decisions on whether to explore, 
produce or sell energy are largely linked to political considerations.  
External energy policy, oil and gas  
6.  In terms of energy security, the EU could realise added-value by developing 
partnerships with supplier countries, acknowledging EU legitimate interests in 
reciprocity and security of supply and suppliers’ legitimate interest in security of 
demand and stable investment conditions. Such partnerships can establish a real 
interdependence between the EU and its suppliers, and thereby can enhance 
predictability and foster investment.  
7.  There is a need to better integrate energy policy and foreign policy. This is best done by 
institutionalising dialogues with producer countries, by using existing tools available, 
such as the European Neighbourhood Policy or trade or development policies. By 
using all available instruments and fora, the EU can effectively support companies in 
gaining access to reserves. 
8.  There is no doubt that an EU unified about energy issues would gain negotiating 
power on the world stage. A first move towards the EU ‘speaking with one voice’ 
could consist of mandates given by member states to the European Commission to 
negotiate specific energy-related issues within particular EU policies. Such a mandate, 
however, would require the European Commission, notably the different Directorates-
General that are involved in energy, competition and external policy, to integrate their 
different approaches vis-à-vis third countries into a unified negotiation position. 
Progress could also be made in the Council of the European Union by improving the 
coordination between the relevant Working Groups dealing with EU security policy 
and the Working Group on Energy, or by appointing a Special Representative for 
Energy in the Council Secretariat.  
9.  Oil and gas will remain a central part of a coherent energy policy for Europe. Although 
EU reserves for oil and gas dwindle, there is still significant indigenous oil and gas 
production in the EU and the EEA (European Economic Area), notably in Norway. 
Constant improvements in exploration technologies and extraction methods alone 
have helped to dramatically increase recovery rates. The EU added-value is to improve 
conditions for investment and trade both within the EU and externally, including 
infrastructure development. Ensuring that investments are made and that the 
considerable remaining potential is fully exploited requires an enduringly competitive 
regulatory regime. Stimulation of investments both in Europe and globally will 
contribute to meeting the requirements of a secure, sustainable and competitive energy 
market.  
10.  External energy policy cannot secure Europe’s energy needs alone. It should be 
complemented by establishing a fully integrated and competitive internal market and 
by diversification of the energy mix with more energy from renewable sources.  
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Research, development and demonstration of energy technology (RD&D) 
11.  The EU needs to step up its effort in the global race to develop more climate-friendly 
technologies. The EU’s leading role in combating climate change and in increasing 
energy efficiency offers opportunities for a worldwide advance in related technologies 
and patents, and for new domains of excellence and export worldwide. The European 
Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) is a step in the right direction aimed at 
boosting a clean technology sector currently characterised by high costs, market 
barriers and underinvestment. 
12.  Diffusion of existing and cleaner and more efficient technologies can have a dramatic 
effect on reducing both GHG emissions and import dependence. Such technology 
diffusion primarily depends on incentives for investment and the related regulatory 
environment. Government R&D support is required, especially in areas where the 
economic return to industry is uncertain due to the level of economic risk, very long 
lead times to mass market or both (e.g. some renewables, fusion, hydrogen, battery 
technology, CO2 sequestration). In these cases, government support is needed for both 
basic research and demonstration, i.e. the pre-commercial development of new 
technologies.  
13.  To create added-value, the EU could define technologies that should receive 
(temporary) support for R&D and demonstration (RD&D). Examples are the 
stimulation of early market investments in the development of low-emissions 
technologies for fossil-fired power plants (CCS) or second-generation biofuels for the 
European transport sector. In addition, a principal EU role is to ensure better 
coordination of industry and member states’ RD&D programmes and dissemination of 
results. The SET-Plan aims at facilitating these coordination efforts. Another effective 
means to support industry RD&D has been EU support for industry commitments 
such as industry technology platforms.  
Backing up EU priorities through data collection and interpretation of information & institutional 
adaptation  
14.  There are economies of scale for collection and interpretation of information and data 
at the European level as it is already acknowledged through the existence of EU bodies 
such as the European Energy Agency (EEA), Eurostat or the proposed Office of the 
Energy Observatory. While ample energy and climate data on energy demand, supply 
or investment needs are available within the EU, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) or other international institutions exist, such data are not necessarily geared 
towards EU-level policy-making. Key economic data on such issues as future 
investment or infrastructure, e.g. grids, pipeline, liquefied natural gas (LNG) or storage 
facilities, will not only facilitate decision-making but also increase transparency.  
15.  A Europe that can act needs suitable institutional arrangements. In many cases, 
coordination will suffice, especially if backed up by good information and data. In few 
cases, however, there will need to be new institutional arrangements or bodies such as 
the proposed agency for the cooperation of national energy regulators or an energy 
coordinator in the Council secretariat.  
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Putting the ‘new EU energy policy’ to the test: Long-term greenhouse gas emissions and renewables 
targets 
16.  Long-term binding targets are a good means to express a vision of what the EU and its 
member states hope to achieve. They thereby affect long-term investment decisions, 
provided these targets can be met with available technologies and within the necessary 
deployment times. Yet, they also pose risks, notably in the form of market 
segmentation, rent-seeking, loss of credibility in the case of apparent non-achievement 
or reversal of policies, which could lead to stranded investment. If they are too 
detailed, targets will deteriorate into planning tools, overriding market incentives and 
reinforcing rent-seeking. The EU targets and policies thus require a rigorous 
assessment as to their potential impacts, notably environmental effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness, competitiveness impacts and implications for the internal market.  
17.  Investment will follow if ‘high-level’ targets are translated into credible and realistic 
implementation strategies by member states, flexible enough, in particular, to adapt to 
the diversity of members states, due to i) their present energy mix, ii) the carbon 
emission intensity of their energy production, iii) the potential of renewables offered 
by their geography and iv) the background of existing energy savings and energy 
efficiency improvements. The ‘added-value’ of the EU is to ensure that EU targets are 
formulated and implemented in such a way that they are coherent with other EU 
policies, especially the internal market, and ideally mutually reinforcing. Such 
coherence is best ensured if the EU develops a joint framework within which member 
states can implement policies to reach targets. National targets will always constitute a 
challenge to the EU as they can distort the internal market and reduce efficiency gains. 
Tradable permit schemes such as the EU ETS are a possible tool to address this 
weakness. But as the EU ETS has shown, in order to make such schemes work, a 
comprehensive EU framework including sanctions is needed.  
The EU ETS 
18.  We can expect that the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) will remain the most 
important, yet not the only policy tool to implement the EU’s ‘high-level’ GHG 
emissions targets. The EU ETS has so far not been able to live up either to its 
environmental nor to its economic promise. The principal shortcomings have been a 
lack of environmental delivery, distortions to competition, wealth transfer and 
unnecessary transaction costs. As a result, there were no clear signals for investment, a 
critical tool to meet the three EU energy policy objectives on climate change, energy 
security and competitiveness. The proposal for the review of the ETS has tried to 
address these shortcomings and has notably concentrated on increasing predictability. 
The added-value of the EU is to ensure environmental effectiveness, non-
discrimination, more harmonisation and the reduction of administrative and 
transaction costs.  
Renewable energy: Utilising the experiences from the ETS 
19.  Ideally, targets that are either set at EU level or derived from it should be implemented 
within an EU policy framework to avoid the disconnect between the market and 
regulation. Given the ambition level of renewables, it will however be indispensable 
that member states retain some flexibility to achieve renewables targets as a result of 
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differences between past policies or member state political preferences. Cost-
effectiveness can be achieved by allowing flexibility between renewables and 
efficiency. In principle, member states’ flexibility (and by extension cost-effectiveness) 
are best guaranteed if targets are expressed for renewables as a whole as a percentage 
of total energy consumption. At the same time, it is important that EU member states 
with a high natural potential for renewable energy expansion will not also be asked to 
foot the bill on behalf of the entire EU. It is critical to the long-term longevity of the 
EU’s renewable ambition that burdens are shared in a way that is perceived to be fair 
by member states. In other words, the financial costs of realising the required physical 
expansion of renewable energy in the EU as a whole must be fairly shared among all 
EU member states.  
20.  If member states are accorded too much discretion, there is a risk of market 
fragmentation or the development of niche products in member states, which would 
increase costs by the need to adapt fuel-consuming applications. The EU’s recent 
proposal for a new renewable energies Directive will need to be consistent with other 
energy policy measures. Specific attention should be given to the third legislative 
package and the EU ETS; consistency with these policies would imply that cross-
border trade should be facilitated. The ideal situation would be an EU-wide EU 
renewables strategy, including one EU support mechanism such as a real possibility for 
cross-border trade in green certificates. Without the benefit of the internal market, 
European customers would probably face a much higher financial burden in fulfilling 
the 20% target. Cross-border trade would also ensure that technology development is 
truly European and thus lead to a better utilisation of renewable energy sources in 
Europe, including the possibility of ensuring uptake of both biomass and wind energy 
resources. To date, however, member states have applied radically different support 
schemes and there is no consensus between member states on a possible EU scheme. 
Similarly, as long as financial support is provided from within a country, policy-
makers will find it difficult to accept that national resources are used for investment in 
another member state. This may however change as markets and economies further 
integrate, as has been the case in the Nordic power market. As an intermediate step, 
the EU could develop the necessary steps to enable future integration of support 
schemes and minimum coherence, such as the preparation of harmonised guarantees 
of origins and grid integration but also of member states’ support schemes. 
21.  To ensure that the new EU legislation on renewable energy sources, i.e. the RES 
Directive, is able deliver discernible European added-value, it should explicitly build 
on the internal energy market. That is, it should provide more than the sum of 27 
national schemes. At the same time, the Directive should not undermine efficient 
national support schemes. One way to achieve this, as proposed in the draft RES 
Directive, is to require member states to measure their target compliance using 
guarantees of origin as the ‘common currency’. Proper rules to ensure that one member 
state is not subsidising the target achievement in another are foreseen.  ENERGY POLICY FOR EUROPE | 7 
II.  Recommendations 
1.  The European Commission should develop a number of energy policy indicators 
against which to assess member state energy policies to ensure coherence between EU 
and member states energy policy measures, by using the bi-annual Strategic Energy 
Review. 
2.  Member states must agree on effective solution(s) to ‘unbundling’.  
3.  The European Commission has acknowledged the role of long-term contracts between 
external producers (i.e. upstream) and companies supplying gas to customers in the 
EU. However, the potential role of long-term and market-based downstream bilateral 
supply agreements in encouraging investment (by ensuring more predictable prices) 
should also be taken into account, as long as they are in compliance with EC 
competition law. 
4.  The EU must develop an agreed common ‘European concept of security of supply’, 
based on an effective internal market but complemented by tools to ensure policy 
coherence (e.g. energy policy indicators) and measures to improve (strategic) network 
development and investment, deal with political risks, supply disruptions and 
solidarity measures. 
5.  The European Commission should continue to develop further EU energy security 
externally through partnerships with supplier countries, notably acknowledging EU 
legitimate interests in reciprocity and security of supply and suppliers’ legitimate 
interest in security of demand and stable investment conditions. The European 
Commission and member states must acknowledge that such partnerships can 
establish a real interdependence between the EU and its suppliers, and thereby can 
enhance predictability and foster investment.  
6.  To facilitate such partnerships by more coherence in the external communication of the 
EU, the European Commission must take the necessary organisational steps to ensure 
that the various directorates-general dealing with energy speak with one voice.  
7.  In addition, member states could give mandates to the European Commission to 
negotiate on specific energy-related issues within particular EU policies with the aim of 
gradually building an EU that ‘speaks with one voice’. 
8.  In order to better integrate energy and external policy and coherence in general, the EU 
must improve capacity (in all institutions) to deal with these cross-cutting issues.  
9.  The EU and member states should put more emphasis on developing EU/EEA 
indigenous oil and gas resources by facilitating technical progress with respect to 
innovative and cost-effective techniques to improve recovery rates. 
10.  The EU and its member states should pool their R&D efforts in the development of 
more efficient and new decarbonised energy technologies, especially in areas where 
there is EU added-value, i.e. because of economies of scale or cross-border externalities. 
11.  The EU and its member states should promote the speedy implementation of the SET-
Plan both in terms of R&D and demonstration (i.e. commercialisation) of promising 
technologies, such as CCS and certain renewables, given the significant potentials for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and import dependency. 
12.  In formulating further EU energy policy targets, the EU and its member states should 
be guided by available technologies and their deployment times.  
13.  The European Commission should rigorously assess national implementation policies 
to reach EU legally binding targets as to whether they are likely to achieve the target 8 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
and also in terms of their effects on the internal market. If needed, the EU should 
develop EU-wide frameworks to achieve such targets while minimising negative 
impacts on the internal market. The phasing-in of a European green certificates-market 
on top of existing national support policies is one option. 
14.  A binding target at EU level should be applied to all member states, but the principle 
of differentiation between member states’ targets for renewables, energy efficiency and 
other low-carbon technologies – justified by material differences between member 
states – should be valid for all low-carbon technologies. For biofuels, care has to be 
taken to ensure harmonised fuel quality standards throughout the EU instead of 
creating a fragmented market, which would cause high costs for both infrastructure 
and car technology. This approach should aim to maintain as broad a technology 
portfolio as possible and avoid market fragmentation brought about, for example, by 
different fuel specifications. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
n an effort to come up with a comprehensive and ambitious response to European energy 
and climate change challenges, the European Union continues to broaden the reflection 
about its future energy systems – taking into account globalisation, increasing market 
liberalisation, environmental pressures, technological challenges, and the growing import 
dependency from politically unstable regions. Following the publication of its Green Paper 
“A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” (European 
Commission, 2006a) in early March 2006, the European Commission tabled a major energy 
policy package on 10 January 2007, entitled “Energy Policy for Europe”, 1 which  was 
accompanied by a number of sectoral policies to implement the overall strategy.2 After 
discussions in the EU Energy and Environment Councils, the EU heads of state and 
governments at their European Council meeting of 8 and 9 March 2007 (European Council, 
2007), by and large endorsed the European Commission’s strategy including:  
1)  A binding absolute emissions reduction commitment of 30% by 2020 compared to 1990 
conditional on a global agreement,3 and a “firm independent commitment” to achieve 
at least a 20% reduction by 2020. At the same time, the EU advocated that 
industrialised countries reduce their emissions collectively by 60% to 80% by 2050 
compared to 1990. The European Parliament in its resolution has insisted that the EU 
should unilaterally commit to 30%.  
2)  20% reduction of primary energy consumption by 2020 compared to projections; 
3)  A binding target of 20% of renewable energy in total energy consumption by 2020; 
4)  A binding minimum target of 10% biofuels of all transport fuels by 2020;  
5)  The development of a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan;  
6)  An endorsement of the European Commission’s carbon capture and sequestration 
policy.  
                                                      
1 Other major contributions to this debate include the climate change Communication and background 
paper on “Winning the battle against climate change” (European Commission, 2005a; 2005b), the 
Green Paper on Energy Efficiency (European Commission, 2005c), the Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
(European Commission, 2006b), the works of the High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and 
the Environment (European Commission, 2006d; 2006e) and the enquiry into the energy sector by DG 
Competition of the European Commission in 2006.  
2  COM(2007) 1: An Energy Policy for Europe; COM(2007) 2: Climate change Communication 
“Limiting global climate change to 2° C”; COM(2006) 845: Biofuels progress report; COM(2006) 848: 
Renewable energy road map; COM(2006) 849: Report on progress in renewable electricity; COM(2006) 
841: Prospect for internal gas and electricity market; COM(2006) 846: Priority interconnection plan; 
COM(2006) 847: Strategic energy technology plan; COM(2006) 843: Sustainable power generation from 
fossil fuels: Aiming for near-zero emissions from coal after 2020; COM(2006) 844: Nuclear illustrative 
programme. 
3  Provided that other developed countries commit themselves to “comparable” reductions and 
economically more advanced countries to contributing “adequately” according to responsibility and 
capabilities. 
I 10 | BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
In the follow-up to the spring 2007 Council, the European Commission has tabled 
various proposals to implement the European Council decisions. A Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan4 was published in November 2007, focusing on specific technologies that 
may help to achieve the 2020 commitments. On 23 January 2008, the Commission presented 
a whole package of proposals,5 containing an update of the EU emissions trading system 
(ETS),6 binding national targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions outside 
the EU ETS until 2020,7 binding national targets for increasing the share of renewable energy 
sources in final energy consumption in 2020,8 proposals on biofuels including environmental 
sustainability criteria,9  new rules to stimulate CCS,10  as well as new state aid rules. The 
adoption of the package by member states is foreseen for the end of 2008, at the earliest.  
Priorities for international cooperation have been formulated in the Action Plan that is 
annexed to the European Council Presidency Conclusion of 8-9 March 2007. Priorities in 
regard to developing countries are: bilateral energy dialogues with China, India, Brazil and 
other emerging economies, focusing on the reduction of GHG emissions, energy efficiency, 
renewables and low-emission energy technologies—notably CCS; enhancing energy 
relationships with Algeria, Egypt and other oil-producing countries in the 
Mashreq/Maghreb region; a special dialogue with African countries on energy and the use 
of Community instruments to enhance decentralised renewable energies in particular, and 
generally energy accessibility and sustainability in this region, as well as energy 
infrastructure of common interest; and promoting access to energy in the context of the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD).  
At the same time, the EU continues to play a key role in the development of emerging 
carbon markets, both in running the world’s largest GHG allowance market in the form of 
the EU ETS and in generating the significant demand for clean development mechanism 
(CDM) and joint implementation (JI) credits.  
To contribute to this debate, the CEPS multi-stakeholder Task Force on Energy Policy 
for Europe has produced this CEPS Task Force Report,11 which attempts to develop the key 
elements for a EU energy policy framework. Although this report focuses mainly on the 
                                                      
4 COM(2007) 723: “Towards a low carbon future – A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan”. 
5 See also COM(2008) 30: “20 20 by 2020 – Europe’s climate change opportunity”. 
6 COM(2008) 16: “Proposals for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
system”. 
7 COM(2008) 17: “Proposals for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effort 
of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas 
emission reduction commitments up to 2020”. 
8 COM(2008) 19: “Proposals for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable resources”. 
9 Included in the proposal on renewable energy resources. 
10  COM(2008) 13: “Supporting Early Demonstration of Sustainable Power Generation from Fossil 
Fuels”, and COM(2008) 18: “Proposals for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC, 96/61/EC, 
Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006”. 
11  In March 2007, the Task Force published an Interim Report containing key messages and 
recommendations in the lead-up to the Spring 2007 European Council (available for free downloading 
on the CEPS online bookshop http://shop.ceps.eu). ENERGY POLICY FOR EUROPE | 11 
internal aspects, i.e. what the EU can implement internally, it nevertheless takes into account 
the external dimension, as this is an important factor in EU energy policy.  
This CEPS Task Force Report concentrates on six key areas  that are discussed in 
chapters 3 to 8.  
1.  The starting point for an EU energy policy framework is to identify the added value of 
a European energy policy for the member states. A truly integrated EU energy policy 
framework will need to be more than just pasting together a number of largely isolated 
sector-specific policies. Putting together a package of unconnected policies risks 
producing a sub-optimal outcome that neglects the inevitable interaction between 
policies (chapter 3).  
2.  The report introduces the concept of ‘robustness’ with regard to EU energy policy, 
referring to its ability to deal with risks associated with developments in the energy 
market. At the heart of this concept is the EU internal energy market. The report makes 
a number of suggestions to enhance robustness both by improving the functioning of 
the internal energy market and by complementary government action. It highlights the 
need for robustness indicators and calls for improvements in the collection and 
interpretation of information and data, both at the EU and member state level (chapter 
4).  
3.  To make progress towards a situation where the EU can speak with one voice, this 
report ponders the possibilities for the EU to assess member state external energy 
policy actions as to their impacts at the EU level and to create more consistency and 
coherence between EU and member state policies. Key issues for international energy 
cooperation and diplomacy will be energy efficiency, investment in production and 
infrastructure, market access and climate change policies (chapter 5). 
4.  The achievement of both energy security and climate change targets is likely to entail 
costs, i.e. it will require paying a premium. In order to allow for long-term 
competitiveness of EU industry – one of the three overall objectives of the EU – the 
report discusses how costs can be minimised (chapter 6).  
5.  This leaves the questions of which is the best instrument to deal with security of 
supply and long-term sustainability and whether market-based or non-market based 
instruments are the best options (chapter 7). The same chapter sets out the conditions 
under which targets can work. It finds that EU targets are useful in expressing a vision, 
but they need to be backed up by credible and realistic implementation strategies.  
6.  The concluding chapter 8 outlines a roadmap for the gradual establishment of an EU 
framework for renewable electricity support. 
The main report is preceded by an Executive Summary including Key Messages and 
Recommendations. We focus in particular on ‘robustness indicators’ and their importance for 
the bi-annual Strategic Energy Review; the next steps to ensure effective linkage between 
competitiveness, energy security and sustainability; and long-term targets within a EU 
framework for renewable electricity support.  
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2.  CHALLENGES IN EUROPEAN ENERGY AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY  
he current energy policy discussion attempts to address three principal long-term 
objectives: i) security of supply, notably growing import dependence, ii) the need to 
drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the interest of the environment, while 
iii) maintaining the EU’s international competitiveness. The particular challenge is to steer 
the EU economy towards a more secure and sustainable path while not jeopardising the 
competitiveness of EU industry and further improving the functioning of EU energy 
markets.  
This has to be achieved against the background of a more difficult and risky 
international environment than in the past.  
•  European energy demand is increasingly rivalled by demand from emerging economies, 
especially in Asia. Without new developments on the supply-side, increasing world 
energy demand will lead to higher prices in the medium and long term posing a real 
threat to European energy security. The International Energy Agency concludes that 
“ensuring reliable and affordable supply will be a formidable challenge” (IEA, 2007). 
•  Oil and gas reserves in the EU are dwindling (see BP, 2007). In some countries, which 
could fill the gap, EU industries have little or no access to reserves. Access to energy 
reserves becomes a critical issue for the EU and other consumer countries.  
•  Energy industries in supplier countries are subject to extensive government interference, 
and do not function in a competitive market framework. To a large extent, energy 
production and export companies are state-owned monopolies. This adds to the fears 
that energy will increasingly be used as a political weapon. Government-regulated 
investment policies also raise doubts about the level of future investments and their 
effects on production and price levels. In the past, many supplier countries have proven 
unable to increase production, adding to the pressure on market prices (e.g. Riley, 2006). 
In addition, security of supply is threatened by political instability of exporting regions.  
•  Many reserves will take years to develop due to problems of access, investments and 
physical conditions. A prolonged tight market might increase political tensions and 
foster a form of ‘resource nationalism’. On top of this, the absence of visible progress 
towards a global climate regime increases uncertainty for investors. 
•  On the positive side, there is a strong and ambitious commitment to energy efficiency 
and conservation in the EU and most other OECD countries and many technological 
options – such as new techniques for exploration and extraction, renewables, nuclear or 
clean coal – exist that could over time address the collective challenges of security of 
supply, climate change and economic competitiveness.  
•  The internal market for electricity and gas, which currently consists of different national 
or regional markets, is still developing and is far from functioning smoothly. Without an 
efficient internal market, the EU/EEA response is likely to lack efficiency, which is 
normally imposed by market discipline, and competitiveness, and member states will 
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feel compelled to resort to national solutions, further undermining the internal market. 
The lack of transparency in the price formation mechanisms – which is also a crucial 
condition and an indicator for the functioning of the internal market – inhibits new 
entry, at least in some member states.  
In addition, the following sector-specific challenges can be identified:  
•  The supply of oil in the EEA and OECD countries has largely been secured by existing 
infrastructure, reinforced by security measures such as the IEA strategic stocks and 
demand restraint measures. However, Europe and all other major consumer regions are 
faced with declining domestic oil extraction rates, leading to increasing import 
dependency and stronger competition between oil importers. At current production 
rates, the EU-25 will have exploited all its proved reserves by the end of 2014 (BP, 2007). 
On the other hand, global estimates of how much recoverable oil remains have 
consistently increased over time. BP (2007) estimated global oil reserves to amount to 1.2 
trillion barrels at the end of 2006. At the current rate of global production, these 
remaining reserves would last for another 40.5 years. This reserves-to-production (R/P) 
ratio has remained rather constant when compared with 1996 and 1986 levels of 41 and 
39.8 years, respectively. However, appropriate investment is the key if future production 
is to succeed in matching demand. Additionally, undiscovered conventional resources 
are estimated to amount to 880 billion barrels (IEA, 2006a). In the long-run, non-
conventional oil resources (e.g. oil sands, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, oil-shale, etc.) 
will play an increasing role in global oil supplies. With estimated reserves of at least 1 
trillion barrels, they are expected to contribute about 8.5% to global oil supplies by 2030 
(IEA, 2007).  Moreover, these resources are mostly located outside the current oil-
producing countries. Whether non-conventional alternatives will be commercially 
available will depend on world oil prices and technology/infrastructure development.  
•  As for natural gas, whatever the expected increase of the LNG market, the EEA will 
increasingly depend on gas pipe supplies coming from very few countries. Whereas over 
80% of the global natural gas reserves of 181.5 trillion m³ (BP, 2007) are located close 
enough to Europe to allow for pipeline transport (Müller, 2007), Europe lacks the 
infrastructure to tap resources in the Middle East, which has the largest proven reserves 
(over 40% of global reserves). Over 80% of Europe’s natural gas imports come from three 
countries (European Commission, 2006b), where the gas market is tightly controlled by 
governments. In this respect, fears of ‘gas cartels’ or of energy being used as a political 
weapon do not seem unfounded. Similarly, there is a risk of a lack of investment in 
exploration, production and transportation, despite reserves being abundantly available 
in areas surrounding Europe. If gas is unable to take a larger share in power generation, 
it will not be able to live up to the expectation that it can serve as a ‘bridge’ to a low-
carbon economy and may even become a ‘sunset’ industry.12 The future carbon price will 
also have an impact on future gas markets.13 
•  Issues for the electricity sector are continuity and reliability of supply. Risks include 
electricity blackouts due to ageing infrastructure and a lack of investment in networks, 
                                                      
12 Unless a combination of demand reduction, new and renewable energies and nuclear power can fill 
the gap, the substitute would be coal, resulting in higher GHG emissions (J. Stern, 2006). 
13  Most gas companies have adjusted their growth expectations downwards after the first carbon 
market experience, due to competition of gas with coal and nuclear for power generation.  14 | BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
especially cross-border capacity, erosion of reserve capacity, public opposition to new 
investment projects in generation and transportation, bad regulation and increasing the 
market share of incumbent companies in domestic generation. A particular aspect is the 
slow progress in liberalisation and integration of the electricity market. Markets in 
‘transition’ create their own risks such as erosion of reserve capacity. Such issues are 
likely to disappear, once the market functions properly.  
•  On top of this, the EU faces the long-term sustainability challenge, namely, the problem 
of climate change. It is generally assumed that in the long term industrial countries will 
need to reduce emissions by up to 60% or more by 2050, not to mention further 
reductions beyond by 2050.14 Given that within the EU, 80% of all emissions are related 
to fossil fuel burning in the energy, transport, household and industrial sectors, energy 
policy will increasingly be constrained by climate change objectives. While near zero 
carbon energy or possibly fusion will ultimately be essential to meet the climate change 
challenge, the present focus is on how to reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuels such as 
coal, oil and gas, which continue to dominate the EU’s energy mix. The principal 
obstacle facing the EU is the absence of a comprehensive global climate-change 
agreement that would provide the necessary certainty for investors when making 
investment decisions. In its absence, it is up to governments both at member state and 
EU level to provide signals to induce investors to make more carbon-friendly 
investments, bringing Europe onto a trajectory towards a near-zero carbon economy 
while neither jeopardising security of supply nor competitiveness. 
                                                      
14 For a stabilisation at 450ppm CO2e, the Stern Review (N. Stern, 2006) assumes a global peak of GHG 
emissions already by 2010 with a 6-10% decline thereafter. For stabilisation at 550ppm CO2e and if 
emissions peak in 2020, the estimate annual declines are around 1-2.5% annually afterwards.  | 15 
 
 
3.  THE EUROPEAN ADDED-VALUE  
 European energy policy should be placed in the overall context of the EU, which is 
based on an internal market and the principles of a competitive market economy, 
free from distortions of restrictive agreements, the abuse of dominant positions or 
state aid. At the same time, the EU’s treaties list other important objectives, including notably 
sustainability, which are sometimes mutually reinforcing while at other times necessitating 
trade-offs. EU energy policy equally needs to be seen in the context that – up to now – 
member states have granted only very limited energy policy competencies to the EU while at 
the same time ceding significant powers in other policy areas such as the internal market, 
competition policy, the environment or research. A principal objective of this emerging EU 
energy policy framework therefore is to identify the European added-value to national energy 
policy-making, not to mention the legal basis. The principle of subsidiarity dictates that an 
EU role is warranted where EU action genuinely has benefits. Otherwise, action should be 
retained at member state or international level (e.g. the IEA, UN or G8).  
3.1  The internal energy market 
The further development of the EU’s internal energy market for gas and electricity is often 
mentioned as one of the principal advantages of a European energy policy. It provides a 
stable and predictable regulatory framework designed to ensure equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of all market participants. In this context, on 19 September 2007, the 
European Commission made another attempt at completing the process towards an internal 
energy market in the EU by proposing a number of measures to complement the existing 
rules. Proposals contained in the ‘third package of legislative proposals’ include the 
separation (unbundling) of production and supply from transmission networks (this would 
also apply to companies from third countries), the establishment of an agency for the 
cooperation of National Energy Regulators, improved market transparency and increased 
solidarity between member states. While a pan-European energy market is under 
development – reinforced by new and additional competencies included in the Treaty of 
Lisbon – member states will likely continue to implement national policies suited for their 
specific market situation. It is vitally important that member state measures do not delay or 
hinder cross-border markets from emerging, in order not to undermine the potential 
efficiency gains from a functioning pan-European market, and avoiding a further re-
nationalisation of energy policy.  
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Box 1. Provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon 
Energy issues are referred to on several occasions in the Treaty of Lisbon signed on 13 December 
2007 by the EU Heads of State or Government. According to the final text still to be ratified by 
member states, energy policy will be a shared competence between the Union and its member states 
in the amended Treaty on European Union (Art. 2 C). In comparison to the previous proposal for a 
Draft Constitution, it includes additional reference to new challenges, such as climate change and 
energy solidarity between the member states in case of difficulties in supply (Art. 100). The latter 
takes into account concerns by certain member states about high energy dependence on one 
supplier country and the effects of possible disruptions of supply. A specific chapter devoted to 
energy (Title XX, Art. 176 A) highlights the importance of a functioning internal energy market in 
line with the need to preserve and improve the environment. Security of supply is the central focus, 
alongside the promotion of energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy. Based on this article, the Union shall aim at promoting the 
interconnection of energy networks. However, any measures to that effect “shall not affect a 
Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”, thus leaving 
member states’ flexibility largely untouched. 
Source: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. 
3.2  Beyond the market  
In addition to a fully integrated and competitive market, government action will be needed 
especially for long-term policy objectives. Examples include R&D or the development of new 
and breakthrough technologies to cope with climate change. Moreover, the EU is dependent 
on imports from areas where market rules do not apply and economic decisions on whether 
to explore, produce or sell energy is largely linked to political considerations.  
This Task Force has identified a number of areas where European added-value is given 
in terms of government intervention: 
1.  On the demand side, the promotion of ambitious energy saving and energy efficiency 
policies could reduce dependence on politically unstable or unreliable countries. 
Another area is investment in energy efficiency programmes by utilities with a focus 
on networks upgrade and smart metering systems to give the customers awareness of 
their consumption through a real time measure. A particular objective should be to 
limit the use of oil to essential areas such as transport and petrochemical, or a reflection 
on how to make best use of natural gas. 
2.  On the supply side, support should be given to near-zero carbon technologies such as 
renewables and carbon capture and storage. This would include especially temporary 
support mechanisms for renewables electricity or second-generation biofuels15 to help 
bring down costs, creating the regulatory framework for carbon capture and storage as 
well as facilitating pilot and demonstration projects in the area. Ultimately, it should be 
                                                      
15  Second-generation biofuels here mean biofuels made from wastes, residues, non-food cellulosic 
material, and ligno-cellulosic material like ligno-cellulose based bioethanols, Fischer-Tropsch diesel 
a n d  b i o - d i m e t h y l e t h e r .  A l t h o u g h  c o n v e n t i o n a l  b i o f u e l s  s u c h  a s  p u r e  v e g e t a b l e  o i l ,  b i o d i e s e l  a n d  
ethanol are cheaper, as CO2 reduction of second-generation biofuels are about the double of those of 
conventional ones, second-generation fuels have a far better cost-benefit ratio (see Jansen & Bakker, 
2006).  ENERGY POLICY FOR EUROPE | 17 
up to the markets to choose the appropriate technologies (be they renewables, carbon 
capture and storage or nuclear) based on the political objectives of the EU and/or its 
member states. Choices will most likely be different across member states depending 
on political preferences, political acceptability and resource endowment.  
3.  On R&D, efforts should focus on all energy technologies, including both demand and 
supply, with the objective of maintaining or increasing diversification and flexibility of 
EU and global energy markets but also to reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuels. 
Attention will be needed to ensure the deployment16 of technologies to bring down 
costs – once these have come close to being competitive – while minimising the 
environmental impact.  
Box 2. A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) 
The SET-Plan was tabled by the European Commission on 22 November 2007. It aims at 
boosting a clean technology sector, currently characterised by high costs, market barriers and 
underinvestment. Its purpose is to accelerate the availability of energy technologies and at 
the same time to engage European industry in the process to help it gain world leadership in 
this sector. The aim of the SET-Plan is thus to turn technology opportunities into business 
realities by delivering a new joint strategic planning, a more effective implementation, an 
increase in resources and a new and reinforced approach to international cooperation. It 
focuses on key technologies to meet the 2020 targets but ventures beyond available 
technologies to achieve the 2050 vision towards complete decarbonisation. However, to 
maintain flexibility in technology development, targets contained in the plan are not binding. 
Also, the plan does not mention how the targets can be reached and how much it will cost to 
achieve them. 
Source: COM(2007) 723: A European strategic energy technology plan (SET-Plan), ‘Towards a low 
carbon future’. 
4.  For oil, the objective should be to maintain or increase market flexibility both in the EU 
and globally (e.g. by increasing spare oil production capacity), liquidity (e.g. by 
preventing oil resources to be excluded from the global market) and diversity (e.g. 
develop unconventional oil), essentially to reduce transaction costs by improving the 
functioning of markets.  
5.  For natural gas, the objective should be to improve the functioning of the internal gas 
market, notably by increasing liquidity both for piped gas and LNG. Liquidity of the 
market presupposes that it remains attractive for producers to deliver sufficient 
volumes to the EU and the right incentives for infrastructure investment are in place. 
In addition, existing bodies such as the Gas Coordination Group could be used to 
identify possible measures to cope with possible supply disruptions, including better 
coordination or harmonisation of national regulations on gas supply and on gas stocks.  
6.  For the electricity sector, continuity and reliability will be enhanced by a more 
harmonised or even unified management of the European grid, more investment in 
generation and grids and improved cooperation between transmission system 
operators (TSOs). These measures, in particular, are a key to foster the regional markets 
and ultimately European energy markets integration. 
                                                      
16 See the presentation of A. Stouge at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 8 November 2006 (Stouge, 
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The above measures constitute the existing ‘EU consensus’ of no-regret options to 
address EU energy policy objectives. Too often, however, such no-regret options fail due to 
policy inertia, expediency or simply lack of interest. To avoid such failure in the future, the 
European Commission in its role as Guardian of the Treaties could be given special 
responsibility for tracking member states and EU progress towards the implementation of 
these measures.  
Röller et al. (2006) show that member states’ energy policies remain largely determined 
by exogenous factors such as availability of domestic resources and geography. Member 
states have very different starting points, facing different energy challenges. Against such a 
background of heterogeneity, identifying the ‘European added-value’ beyond the above 
consensus will be difficult. On the other hand, if an energy policy for Europe attempts to go 
beyond the ‘lowest common denominator’, i.e. the policies and measures that all member 
states agree with, such a policy will need to submit member states to the test on whether 
domestic energy policies meet “agreed EU policy objectives”.  
There are additional possible measures at EU or member state level available to further 
increase the robustness of the EU energy sector and have a generally positive cost-benefit 
ratio from an overall social perspective, including cost-efficiency, climate change, other 
environmental impacts and security of supply. They include public financial support for 
electricity interconnectors or gas pipelines,17  common approaches to LNG or gas storage 
taking into account security of supply, investment in additional supply including 
renewables, biofuels or nuclear and EU-wide crisis or solidarity measures in case of supply 
disruption.18  
3.3  Policy integration  
Solving the triple challenge of securing energy supplies, sustainability and competitiveness 
requires more than just pasting together a number of largely isolated sector-specific policies. 
Lumping together disconnected policies risks producing a sub-optimal outcome that 
overlooks the interaction between policies. The recent energy and climate change package of 
the European Commission, tabled on 23 January 2008, marks a first step to develop an 
integrated approach towards an EU energy policy.  
To date, there are various instruments available to ensure coherence. At the level of the 
European Commission, they include notably inter-service consultations and integrated 
impact assessments (IIAs) for all major policy initiatives. Also at Council level, there is a 
drive towards more policy coherence. As to the effectiveness of these tools, much depends 
on how they are applied. Efforts are made in both the European Commission and by the 
                                                      
17 The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty add an extra aim “to promote the interconnection of energy 
networks” as well as stating that energy policy should be carried out in a “spirit of solidarity” among 
member states. 
18 For example, the CPB (2004) has identified the following measures with a positive cost-benefit ratio: 
extending the size of strategic oil stocks, subsidising biomass in the transport and chemicals sectors, 
conserving the Groningen gas field, encouraging investments in wind turbines, coal-fired plants or 
nuclear power replacing gas-fired plants, better incentives for power generation reserve capacity and 
changes in the regulator of electricity networks. The recent CEPS/ECN study (Egenhofer et al., 2006) 
has identified, among others, CHP, IGCC, second-generation biomass and technology support as 
measures with a positive cost-benefit ratio. ENERGY POLICY FOR EUROPE | 19 
Council Secretariat, but initiatives for better coherence have not been without difficulties 
(e.g. see Renda, 2006; Egenhofer et al., 2006).  
There have been examples for integrated approaches. These include the Auto-Oil 
programme, the European Climate Change Programme and the recent European 
Commission proposal to tackle CO2  emissions from cars. Each of these initiatives has 
constituted considerable effort in terms of scientific input and stakeholder contribution. The 
Strategic EU Energy Review should draw lessons as to the importance of data, analysis and 
stakeholder involvement.  
Equally important is coherence between EU and member state actions. Given the 
limited EU competencies on energy policy, member states enjoy considerable discretion in 
this area and it is far from evident that national energy policy initiatives, notably in the area 
of security of supply are beneficial to the EU as a whole. Examples include the planned 
‘Nord Stream’ and ‘South Stream’ gas pipelines, some recent equity, some recent equity 
investment of Gazprom in member states, the lack of a credible renewables strategy or the 
phasing out of nuclear power without a credible policy to substitute for it. This raises the 
question of whether future Strategic EU Energy Reviews should include a systematic 
assessment of EU impacts of national energy policies and measures. 20 | 
 
 
4.  THE CONCEPT OF ROBUSTNESS OF 
EU ENERGY POLICY 
f we follow the European Commission’s and the IEA’s analysis that energy supplies may 
become more risky than in the past, the EU would be well advised to put in place a 
robust domestic system to ‘insure’ against supply and other energy policy risks. The idea 
therefore would be to develop an EU policy framework that is both effective in achieving EU 
long-term objectives and sufficiently robust to deal with risks. Such a framework would best 
stress predictability, flexibility, coherence and cost-efficiency, in addition to – if warranted – 
built-in solidarity or crisis mechanisms. The CEPS Task Force attempted to develop a 
number of EU energy policy indicators to express robustness of member state and EU energy 
policies. 
Table 1. Energy policy index (EPI) 
Country    Competitiveness  Security of supply  Environment sustainability 
Austria AT  2.7  3.0  3.7 
Belgium BE  2.0  1.2  1.8 
Cyprus CY  0.5  0.0  2.0 
Czech Republic  CZ  2.8  3.1  2.8 
Germany DE  1.9  2.5  3.0 
Denmark DK  3.6  4.0  3.4 
Estonia EE 1.2  3.2  3.3 
Spain ES  1.9  1.9  2.4 
Finland FI  1.5  2.0  4.8 
France FR  0.8  2.6  3.8 
Greece GR  0.8  2.5  2.8 
Hungary HU  2.9  2.1  3.2 
Ireland IE 1.1  0.8  2.4 
Italy IT  2.4  1.9  2.7 
Lithuania LT  3.5  2.4  4.1 
Luxembourg LU  3.9  3.0  2.5 
Latvia LV  2.6  1.5  5.3 
Malta MT  0.0  0.0  1.3 
Netherlands NL  2.6  2.7  3.2 
Poland PL  1.8  4.6  2.6 
Portugal PT  2.3  1.5  3.3 
Sweden SE  2.3  2.7  5.0 
Slovenia SI  4.1  1.9  3.9 
Slovakia SK  2.5  1.7  3.0 
United Kingdom  UK  2.9  3.5  3.1 
Note: The higher the value of a specific indicator (0 to 6), the better the performance in terms of the criteria 
defined in the EPI. 
Source: Röller et al. (2007). 
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Röller et al. (2007) have developed a relatively simple so-called ‘energy policy index’ 
(EPI) to assess the performance of member states against the EU’s energy policy objectives of 
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability (see Table 1 on the preceding page). 
The initial finding is that heterogeneity prevails, mainly due to different exogenous factors, 
such as geographical location, availability of domestic resources and political preferences. 
The study finds five different groups of countries, suggesting that there are no clear 
correlations between scores of the three different energy policy objectives. Hence, member 
states start at very different starting points, facing different energy challenges.  
4.1  Principal EU energy policy risks  
There is a long literature on security of supply risks. Based on the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 1995), the literature traditionally distinguishes between short-term and long-
term risks (see Stern, 2002 and Luciani, 2004). Short-term risks are generally associated with 
supply shortages because of accidents, terrorist attacks, extreme weather conditions or 
technical failure of the grid. This is sometimes described as ‘operational security’ or ‘systems 
security’. Long-term security is associated with the long-term adequacy of supply, the 
infrastructure for delivering this supply to markets and a framework to create strategic 
security against major risks (such as non-delivery for political, economic, force majeure or 
other reasons). The European Commission’s 2000 Green Paper on security of supply has 
identified four risk categories: technical, economic, political and environmental risks.19 
By thus expanding the narrow concept of security of supply, we can develop a number 
of EU energy policy indicators to be used as a basis for assessing robustness of member state 
and EU energy policies. The starting point is the identification of relevant risks. We have 
identified six: 
1.  Import dependence on producer and transit countries; 
2.  Investment risk, including investments within the EU internal market (e.g. in 
infrastructure or reserve capacity) and beyond (e.g. in non-EU transportation 
infrastructure or upstream investment in supplier countries);  
3.  Environmental risks from climate change, regional/local pollution or contamination due 
to accidents;  
4.  Regulatory and political  risks due to inefficient or failed regulation or local market 
disruptions due to pressure group actions (e.g. opposition against new investment, fuel 
price protests, etc.); 
5.  Risks associated mainly with market failure (e.g. excessive concentration of market 
power or failure of financial markets); and 
6.  Excessive  energy prices, which can originate from any of the above risks or a 
combination thereof.  
                                                      
19 Technical risks include systems failure due to weather, lack of capital investment or generally bad 
conditions of the energy system. Economic risks cover mainly imbalances between demand and supply 
due to a lack of investment or insufficient contracting. Political risks outline potential government 
policies to suspend deliveries due to deliberate policies or war or civil strife or as a result of failed 
regulation, which is referred to as regulatory risk. Environmental risks describe the potential damage 
from accidents (oil spills, nuclear accidents) or pollution, including pollution whose effects are less 
tangible or predictable (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions). 22 | BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
Risks can be further distinguished and grouped in sub-categories as shown in Annex 1. 
For the purposes of this report, a general categorisation will suffice (e.g. Egenhofer, 2007a). 
4.2  Robustness indicators  
The assumption is that in order to cope with the risks associated with EU energy policy 
objectives – competitiveness, security of supply and climate change – both member state and 
EU energy policies need to match a number of ‘robustness indicators’. The CEPS Task Force 
has identified the following 10 robustness indicators: 
1.  Share of biggest irreplaceable single import source (taking substitution possibilities into 
account); 
2.  Share of biggest irreplaceable single energy source (taking substitution possibilities into 
account); 
3.  Progress towards different EU and national policy targets (e.g. GHG emissions 
reductions, renewables, energy efficiency and conservation targets); 
4.  Energy intensity in absolute terms (corrected by climate and other factors) and 
improvement over time for the economy/domestic sectors; 
5.  Reserve and excess capacity in generation, interconnections, transportation of natural 
gas, gasification terminals, gas storage, etc.; 
6.  Internal market indicators (e.g. relative competition for final consumers, choice of 
transportation or competition between fuels); 
7.  A degree of protection of vulnerable consumers against supply disruptions;  
8.  A set (i.e. reasonable) degree of solidarity measures (excluding for example structural 
imports); 
9.  Public and private energy R&D spending; and 
10.  Tolerable impact of EU-induced energy price increases for EU industry subject to 
global competition. 
While the above-mentioned ‘robustness indicators’ will need considerable 
methodological refinement as well as suitable data to become useful, they could become a 
valuable tool for the European Commission to track performance of individual member 
states and the EU as a whole or to evaluate the degree to which energy policy objectives are 
integrated. Such an assessment of member state and EU progress is politically very sensitive, 
as it will affect member state autonomy. However, a meaningful EU energy policy beyond 
the status quo – especially in the light of the Lisbon Treaty – will require member states to 
accept some sort of benchmarking.  
4.3  Data requirements 
The development of European energy indicators requires considerable improvement in the 
collection and interpretation of data and information, both at EU and member state level. 
There are economies of scale for collection and interpretation of information and data at the 
European level, as testified to by the existence of EU bodies such as the EEA, Eurostat or the 
proposed Office of the Energy Observatory. While ample energy and climate data on energy 
demand, supply or investment needs are available within the EU, the International Energy 
Agency or other international institutions, such data are not necessarily geared towards EU-
level policy-making. The collection of key econo m i c  d a t a ,  e . g .  o n  f u t u r e  i n v e s t m e n t  o r  
infrastructure such as grids, pipelines and LNG or storage facilities, will not only facilitate 
decision-making but also increase transparency.  | 23  
 
 
5.  SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE: THE ROLE OF THE 
EU’S EXTERNAL POLICY 
ne of the recurring themes of the EU integrated climate and energy package is the 
alleged need for Europe to speak with one voice. Implicitly, this includes coherence 
between internal and external policies. As early as March 2006, the Green Paper 
(European Commission, 2006a) identified a “coherent external energy policy” as one of the 
six EU energy policy pillars.20  The Green Paper has taken a procedural approach and is 
putting its faith in the Strategic EU Energy Review to serve as the basis for establishing a 
common EU vision, which will gradually become a common external voice. In addition, the 
European Commission had listed an ambitious catalogue of themes for this “common 
external policy” including amongst others, a clear policy on securing and diversifying energy 
supplies  and reacting effectively to external crisis situations, in addition to more predictable 
suggestions such as entering into energy partnerships with producers, transit countries and 
other international actors, integrating energy into other policies with an external dimension, 
and using energy to promote development. An important step has been the June 2006 
European Council decision to adopt the proposed legal framework for the external energy 
policy on the basis of the joint paper by the European Commission and the High 
Representative. Amongst others, this decision foresees the creation of a network of energy 
correspondents (consisting of representatives by member states and the General Secretariats 
of both the Commission and the Council) to set up an early-warning system and to improve 
the reaction in case of a crisis. The 2007 Spring European Council finally agreed on an action 
plan for international energy policy, 21   essentially aiming at better coordination and 
                                                      
20 The energy challenges facing Europe need a coherent external policy to enable Europe to play a 
more effective international role in tackling common problems with energy partners worldwide 
(European Commission, 2006a). 
21 The focus is on speeding-up the development of a common approach to external energy policy, 
involving consumer-to-producer as well as consumer-to-consumer and consumer-to-transit countries, 
dialogues and partnerships, involving organisations such as OPEC. More concretely, the European 
Council has formulated the following objectives: i) negotiating and finalising a post-partnership and 
cooperation agreement with Russia in particular relating to energy issues; ii) intensifying the EU 
relationship with Central Asia, the Caspian and the Black Sea regions, with a view to further 
diversifying sources and routes; iii) strengthening partnership and cooperation, building on the 
bilateral energy dialogues with the US as well as with China, India, Brazil and other emerging 
economies, focusing on the reduction of GHG emissions, energy efficiency, renewables and low-
emissions energy technologies, notably carbon capture and storage (CCS); iv) ensuring the 
implementation of the Energy Community Treaty, with a view to its further development and 
possible extension to Norway, Turkey, Ukraine and Moldova; v) making full use of the instruments 
available under the European Neighbourhood Policy; vi) enhancing energy relationships with Algeria, 
Egypt and other producing countries in the Mashreq/Maghreb region; vii) building a special dialogue 
with African countries on energy and using Community instruments to enhance in particular 
decentralised renewable energies and generally energy accessibility and sustainability in this region, 
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coherence. A further politicisation of energy issues has also been suggested in a recent report 
adopted by the European Parliament (2007), which proposes the creation of a post for a High 
Official of Foreign Energy Policy. Other measures to increase security of supply include the 
Energy Charter Treaty to be the cornerstone of a common European foreign policy on 
energy, the creation of a solidarity mechanism to deal with disruptions of supply or 
infrastructure damage, as well as diversification and increased energy efficiency.  
5.1  Preconditions  
Although the concept of ‘speaking with one voice’ expresses the potential added-value of the 
EU presenting a harmonised external position, it faces the dilemma that EU member states 
pursue different national policies and interests stemming from their heterogeneity and the 
different starting points discussed above, such as the degree of energy market liberalisation, 
differences in the energy mix or levels of diversification, geographical location or even 
differences in foreign policy objectives.22  
As a result, the added-value for the EU external energy policy has yet to be convincingly 
defined based on economic and political realities. Nevertheless, there seems to be a 
consensus on two broad strategies: i) the widening of EU energy markets combined with the 
reinforcement of energy partnerships with a view to improving the functioning of world 
markets in energy, and ii) the diversification of energy supplies by source, geographical 
origin and transit route.23  The principal EU role therefore will be to improve the basic 
conditions under which companies and member state policies operate.24 The  European 
Commission’s announcement of its intention to include “major energy chapters in its 
relations with neighbouring countries” as well as to put energy issues on the agenda of every 
summit with third countries is an important step towards an increasingly common external 
energy policy. From an EU perspective, key issues will be energy efficiency (as this reduces 
global demand and GHG emissions), investment in production and infrastructure (to 
increase competition and ensure adequate supply), market access (for European and 
international energy companies) and climate change policies (to reduce global greenhouse 
gas emissions) as well as other environmental and safety issues, especially in regard to 
nuclear energy. 
As a first step, an EU-wide consensus will need to be found, followed by the 
integration of external energy policy into other policies. Again, the onus will be mainly on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
as well as energy infrastructure of common interest; and xiii) promoting access to energy in the 
context of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD). 
22 For example, there are very different views across the EU on how to deal with Russia.  
23 See Paper by the European Commission and the Council Secretary General/High Representative in 
the summer 2006, and the European Commission’s contribution to the Lahti European Council 
(European Commission, 2006f). 
24 Promotion of principles of the internal energy market in bilateral and multi-lateral fora, combined 
with improved interconnections are likely to work as long as the EU’s partners see benefits from this. 
This can be expected to work within the context of relations within the EEA, the EU neighbourhood 
countries, other associated countries and within international organisations such as IEA or the Energy 
Charter Treaty. It will be more difficult to influence the behaviour of some key supplier countries 
where EU leverage is limited. It would be an illusion to believe that the EU can induce them to change 
their behaviour – often against their interests. Trying to force Russia to sign the Energy Charter Treaty 
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the European Commission to ensure coherence and continuity, although Council 
cooperation in coherence matters has been found important but difficult to obtain (Egenhofer 
et al., 2006). This will however mean that only those issues on which a consensus exists will 
be brought to the agenda of summits with third countries. This will probably fall 
considerably short of assisting oil and gas companies operating in Europe to obtain access to 
reserves by lending diplomatic weight to EU investors. Such support is likely to be 
continued by member state governments to companies of national parentage in the absence 
of a truly integrated EU-wide internal market and a common foreign policy.  
5.2  Outlook 
There has been institutional progress through the creation of the network of energy 
correspondents to strengthen the early-warning capacity and coordination to an extent. 
Further impacts can be expected of the Lisbon Treaty, which retains the article on energy 
policy introduced by the draft Constitutional Treaty (see Box 1). It can be expected that the 
‘solidarity clause’ will lead to some more concrete measures. In addition, the creation of an 
EU energy policy competence will offer the possibility to better coordinate action within the 
Council Secretariat.  
If EU member states agreed that ‘speaking with one voice’ is an objective to pursue, the 
EU – possibly through the European Commission – should be given some mechanism to 
assess potential impacts of national external energy and security of supply policies for the 
EU, its internal market and other member states. This could increase transparency of and 
awareness for the impact of member state policies on the EU and its member states.  
The added-value of a High Official for Foreign Energy Policy (‘Mr Energy’), as recently 
proposed by the European Parliament (2007) and some member states, is doubtful. 
Responsible for coordinating all policies under the scope of the common European foreign 
policy on energy, such an EU representative would merely duplicate available capacity to 
represent European interests (or future common positions) to third parties through the 
Commission or the EU Presidency. Improved coordination can be achieved within the 
current institutional set-up or at least after the Lisbon Treaty is in place. Improving the 
current structure would also avoid creating a new bureaucracy and the potential fighting for 
competence.  26 | 
 
 
6.  WHAT PRICE TO PAY FOR ENERGY SECURITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY?  
n recent decades, energy was abundantly available and at low prices. This situation has 
changed. Various trends have transformed the global energy market from one favourable 
to consumers to a sellers’ market. With EU domestic reserves rapidly decreasing and 
tight production capacity, future energy security may require paying a premium. This would 
also square with analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA), showing that there are 
sufficient – but more costly – recoverable resources of fossil fuels, such as deep-water, super-
deep and arctic oil, enhanced oil recovery, heavy oil bitumen, oil-shale, and gas or coal to 
liquids – to cover global demand at or below current oil prices, even if CO2 costs are included 
(Pflüger, 2006; IEA, 2006b). At present levels of production and demand, proven reserves far 
exceed annual demand.25 In addition, there are renewable, nuclear and clean coal options. 
IEA analysis also indicates that price increases affect demand; the oil price shocks in the 
1970s and 1980s triggered a major demand effect in the form of considerable energy 
efficiency improvements, the effect stretching over a decade. Similar developments can be 
observed since the latest oil price rises (Gros et al., 2006). In terms of sustainability, the main 
challenge will be to deal with considerable costs related to the mitigation of and adaptation 
to climate change.26 
Theoretically, achieving both energy policy and climate change objectives could be 
achieved by true internalisation of external costs. However internalisation of externalities is 
not a straightforward matter and is fraught with methodological and data issues. In addition, 
internalisation is not an automatic guarantee for environmental sustainability or security of 
supply due to market and non-market barriers.  
6.1  The cost of security of supply  
It is generally assumed that the market price reflects the security premium, assuming that 
energy supply companies internalise security of supply concerns to a large extent with 
government regulation doing the rest. Market prices would then reflect all relevant 
information; at least concerning the public-domain.27  This view, however, is not shared 
universally. Market participants tend to give more weight to short-term rather than long-
term aspects. Short-term aspects in the oil and gas market are interrelated boom-bust 
upstream and downstream investment cycles on the one hand and strongly bullish and 
bearish price expectations on the other. It has therefore been argued that long-term energy 
                                                      
25 For instance, the IEA (2006c) estimates that the world reserve base of coal will last for close to 170 
years, if the total 2004 proved recoverable reserves are divided by the total production of coal in 2005. 
26 UNFCCC (2007) estimates that an additional $248-381 billion (2005 USD) would be required in the 
year 2030 to return global GHG emissions to the level of 2004. 
27  It is argued that currently high oil prices reflect a ‘risk premium’ expressing the political risks 
associated with a number of key supplier countries.  
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security risks from a societal point of view may not be adequately factored in prevailing gas 
and oil prices. The principal reasons are the increasing market power of key oil and gas 
exporting countries and their possibility to exert windfall rents, political instability and 
political risks but also uncertainty about the actual rate of depletion of ultimately recoverable 
oil and gas reserves throughout the world.  
Various approaches have been used to assess the external costs of security of supply. 
Some studies (see Constantini & Gracceva, 2004 for an overview), e.g. by DRI and the US 
Department of Energy (DoE), have concentrated on GDP losses in the event of a supply 
crisis, which usually translates into higher oil prices.28 However, there is no clear correlation 
between initial losses and resulting oil price increases because during past supply 
disruptions, losses were in most cases offset by production increases elsewhere. Other 
studies, mainly concerned with electricity supply disruptions have attempted to identify the 
social costs of an electricity supply disruption. Analysis has shown that this value is highly 
dependent on the quality and composition of various factors, such as population density, 
duration and continuity, the time of the disruption, the season or the availability and timing 
of advance warning (Constantini & Gracceva, 2004). ECN have used risk premiums to 
express security of supply risks (see Jansen & Bakker, 2006). OXERA (2003) has assessed the 
non-market value of generation technologies such as wind and nuclear, to identify the 
security of supply premium for different technologies. Finally, a study by the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (2004) has found that measures to reduce 
the costs of disturbances on energy markets are generally smaller than costs of measures 
directed at preventing or mitigating consequences of those disturbances.  
6.2  Climate change: More than just a carbon price  
Two market failures are generally referred to in the context of climate change.29 First and 
foremost, the cost of global warming is not borne directly by GHG emitters, leading to fossil-
fuel prices that are ‘too cheap’ and, as a consequence, to excessive levels of GHG emissions. 
Second, there are market deficiencies related to the development and adoption of new 
technologies.30 Due to ‘knowledge spillovers’, innovating firms cannot keep other firms from 
benefiting from new knowledge and, therefore, cannot capture all the benefits of innovation 
for themselves. Also, there are ‘adoption spillovers’, which describe the fact that the cost or 
value of a new technology to one user may depend on how many other users have adopted 
the technology. Furthermore, market shortcomings arise due to incomplete information. While 
all investment is characterised by uncertainty, the uncertainty associated with the returns to 
investment in innovation is often particularly large. Finally, incomplete information can be a 
                                                      
28 Constantini & Gracceva (2004) find that the estimates of price increases per barrel due to supply 
disruptions range from $1.50-$2 for the DRI model to $3.50-$4 for the DoE model, in the event of a 
sudden cut of oil production of 1mb/d within about three months, assuming oil prices in the $15-20 
range. They also find that in 2002, the European Commission estimated that an increase of $10 per 
barrel of oil is likely to reduce economic growth in industrialised countries by 0.5%. Ogden et al. 
(2004) argue that military expenses to safeguard access to Middle East oil can be used to make a 
conservative estimate of energy security external cost. They come to $15-$44 per barrel for the US. 
29 This section draws on the summary in de Coninck et al. (2007). 
30 These technology market problems are not as relevant for environmental problems addressed over 
the course of years as they are for climate policy developing over decades or centuries and requiring 
much more dramatic changes in technology (see Jaffe et al., 2005, for an overview). 28 | BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
barrier, for example, when a builder or landlord chooses the level of investment in energy 
efficiency in a building but the energy bills are paid by a successive owner or a tenant. 
Hence, the economist’s policy prescription to ‘put a price’ on GHG emissions, thereby 
forcing individuals and firms to internalise the cost that they are placing on everyone else 
when they emit GHGs, does not always work.  
In all likelihood, the price mechanism will need to be complemented by other 
measures, such as:  
•  Supporting the introduction of new, promising energy-production technologies. For 
example, in the case of wind energy, the IEA estimates that each doubling of capacity 
can lower the costs by 18-20%.31 Such ‘learning curves’ differ for different technologies, 
mainly depending on their maturity. Nevertheless, learning curves have a considerable 
impact in reducing the cost of GHG mitigation policies in the future. Although present 
emissions reductions may be relatively modest, certain technologies may contribute 
significantly to GHG emissions reduction in the future. However, technologies that are 
far from being competitive should be supported by traditional R&D funding.  
•  Similarly important is support of long-term R&D for yet unknown breakthrough 
technologies. Markets generally do not provide sufficient incentives for R&D for 
technologies with a very long time horizon and/or uncertain outcome. Public support 
will be needed.  
•  Investments in energy efficiency tend to yield benefits in terms of security of supply, 
climate change and competitiveness, whether they improve insulation or make the 
choice of efficient appliances or fuels more enticing.32 Yet, such investments are often 
not made because of numerous market and non-market barriers, especially in the 
domestic and small business sectors. Energy efficiency investments have the additional 
value of reducing the total energy bill of households or firms. The latter is particularly 
important as new energy technologies or policies to combat climate change are 
expected to increase both wholesale and retail energy prices. More efficient use of 
energy will be critical as a possible compensation for higher-unit energy costs to keep 
overall energy expenditure stable.  
 
                                                      
31 See Pflüger (2006). 
32  For example, a recent CEPS/ECN study on a cost-benefit analysis of different climate change 
options suggests that the level of household expenditure for energy efficiency is lower than justified 
by net private and social benefits (Egenhofer et al., 2006). | 29  
 
 
7.  MARKET-BASED POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND 
TARGETS: HOW, WHY AND WHEN? 
  central part of the integrated EU climate and energy policy is to push climate-
friendly technologies both to reduce GHG and to foster technological development. 
At the same time, the EU’s commitment to a unilateral approach has increased fears 
of reduced global competitiveness. The EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) and targets are 
thus in the focus of the debate, which is also reflected in this Task Force Report.  
7.1  The EU ETS 
Although the EU ETS has principally been implemented as an instrument to achieve climate 
change objectives, it can also be seen as a first major attempt at the EU level to internalise an 
environmental externality (i.e. CO2 emissions). In theory, under the ETS, the market price of 
carbon is driven by a combination of the marginal abatement costs of all controlled sources 
and the emissions cap, thereby ensuring that the environmental objective is achieved at the 
least cost, thereby minimising the impact on competitiveness. The resulting market price was 
expected to create long-term predictability, which is critical for spurring investment, while 
offering flexibility to companies to choose the most cost-effective compliance strategy.  
The basic idea of the ETS, i.e. the introduction of a tradable permit system for major 
fixed installations and the power sector, is generally accepted by most stakeholders in the EU. 
Stakeholders also agree that the ETS has a number of shortcomings.33 These include the lack 
of investment incentives, possible distortions of competition in the internal market, overall 
complexity, and its effects on the short-term and long-term competitiveness of industry 
operating in Europe, mainly as a result of the indirect impact of increased power prices, 
while its general effectiveness is limited (e.g. Egenhofer, 2007b). If these shortcomings can be 
fixed, as the revised Commission’s EU ETS proposal attempts to do, the EU ETS would 
potentially be able to internalise the external effects of CO2  emissions and other GHG 
emissions, at least to some extent. On the global level, there have been proposals to use the 
EU ETS to link emissions trading schemes in various countries. So far, however, this has not 
been pursued, partly because of fears of loss of competitiveness in the absence of a global 
carbon constraint, and partly because it is difficult to assess the external costs of climate 
change. In reality, the EU ETS reflects abatement costs. 34  
This leaves open the questions of which instrument is best for dealing with security of 
supply, and whether market-based or non-market-based instruments are the best options. A 
few tentative remarks can be made in this regard, as follows: 
                                                      
33  See European Commission (2006g), and for an overview, see Egenhofer et al. (2006) and the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) reports. 
34 The Stern Review (Stern, 2006) on the economics of climate change seems to use estimated marginal 
abatement costs in the range of $5 to $49/tCO2.  
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•  To the extent that renewables are seen as contributing to security of energy supply, the 
motto ‘one goal, one instrument’ should be observed.35  This means that a policy 
instrument other than the EU ETS should be used to advance the cause of energy 
security of supply, although instruments should be compatible and ideally mutually 
reinforcing.  
•  Price signals cannot solve everything. It is well established that energy efficiency and 
conservation suffer from a host of market failures mainly in households and the small 
business sector. These can be addressed by regulation, subsidies, green procurement, 
labelling or awareness-raising activities. This is especially the case for R&D support for 
technologies that are far from competitive. 
•  There may also be a role for environmental taxation as an alternative price mechanism, 
which may entail lower costs for the covered sectors. Given the unanimity rule, which 
governs such decisions in the European Council, taxes are more likely to be applied at 
member state level.  
7.2  Targets  
In discussions over EU energy policy, the concept of targets has been very prominent.36 This 
is not surprising. Targets have been an important part of the EU tool box, starting with the 
EEC Treaty that set a target for creating a Customs Union. A similar approach was used to 
create the internal market by 1992. As it is generally assumed that this so-called ‘1992 
internal market programme target’ has been met, it is considered a success. On various 
occasions since 1992, the EU has attempted to apply this same formula, e.g. the sectoral 
targets formulated for renewable energy for electricity and biofuels. In reality, however, the 
EU record on targets is mixed at best. Witness the difficulties to make progress towards 
achieving the Lisbon target to transform Europe into “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-driven economy by 2010”, or meeting the Maastricht criteria related to the 
eurozone or targets agreed for renewable energy for electricity or biofuels in transport. 
Proponents argue that targets can be useful in achieving policy objectives or moving 
sectors in a certain direction. Even if they are not fully met, the result would still be better 
than what would have been obtained in their absence. Opponents argue that targets segment 
                                                      
35  It is a basic principle of economics that sound policy requires at least as many types of policy 
instruments as there are market problems to be addressed (Tinbergen, 1956). Hence, the optimal set of 
climate policies would also include instruments explicitly designed to foster innovation, and possibly 
technology diffusion, in addition to GHG emissions abatement policies that stimulate new technology 
as a side effect of internalising the GHG externality. Likewise, long-term R&D alone is not sufficient 
because it provides no direct incentives for the adoption of new technologies and focuses on the 
longer term, missing near-term opportunities for cost-effective emissions reductions (Philibert, 2003; 
Sandén & Azar, 2005; Fischer & Newell, 2004).  
36 For example Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs has raised the question of the wisdom of setting 
a number of long-term ‘sectoral’ targets – i.e. applied to different technologies – such as for energy 
efficiency or intensity, renewables, the EU ETS but also for technology projects. One could also think 
of targets for combined heat and power (CHP), carbon capture and storage (CCS), strategic gas 
storage or energy security as developed by ECN and the Clingendael Institute, which have been 
developing such targets based on indicators for diversification or demand-side flexibility (Scheepers et 
al., 2006). Commission President José Manuel Barroso has speculated on the use of an EU target for 
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the internal market, if the targets are national or differentiated between member states, while 
encouraging rent-seeking by lobbies (Michaelowa, 2004; Fullerton & Metcalf, 2001). In 
addition, if targets are too ambitious, there is a risk of imposing excessive costs, making 
targets politically untenable, possibly leading to a reversal of policy. Under such a scenario, 
the international credibility of the EU in the area of climate change might suffer as a 
consequence. 
7.2.1  Best practice in target-setting 
Targets are a good means to express a vision of what the EU and its member states hope to 
achieve. If properly set, targets can be useful in steering investment in a certain direction 
while avoiding the most important risks: market segmentation, rent-seeking, lack of 
credibility or reversal of a policy leading to stranded investment. The following section 
draws on previous analysis (Egenhofer, 2007c).  
Since targets constitute a significant intervention, they should only be applied in cases 
where the objective to be achieved is significant, e.g. energy security or long-term climate 
change. The more targets there are, the less flexibility there is for the market to allocate 
resources. Ultimately, targets can degenerate into ‘planning’ tools, overriding market 
incentives and reinforcing rent-seeking. At the same time, objectives must be realistic and 
achievable, i.e. ‘what is needed’ should be broadly in line with ‘what is possible’.  
Targets can only fulfil one objective and not several at a time, although all costs and 
benefits should be factored in when targets are set.37  
It is critical to formulate the target properly. By defining the required outcome (e.g. 
near-zero carbon power generation) rather than prescribing the possible solutions (e.g. 
renewables, nuclear, CCS, etc.), the market will be able to choose the most economic solution. 
Sectoral targets (e.g. for renewables or CCS) may still be needed for a transition period, to 
avoid crowding out certain technologies.  
Targets can be set at the member state or at the EU level. From an internal market and 
allocation perspective, targets would be ideally set at the EU level, but the current 
heterogeneity of member states in terms of economic development, the structure of the 
energy sector – particularly in power generation – and national preferences, makes this more 
difficult. If targets are expressed at member state level, efficiency and flexibility of 
implementation can be enhanced by making quotas or obligations tradable across borders, as 
proposed by the Commission in the form of a renewable energy trading regime.38 To avoid a 
race for subsidies, subsidised products or services can be excluded from trading (as 
proposed by the Commission for renewable energy). Similarly, aligning overall levels of 
subsidy for the same product or service in each member state would avoid taking ‘double 
advantage’ of the system. 
 
                                                      
37 E.g. boosting renewables to bring down technology costs, increasing biofuels to increase supply 
flexibility for transport fuels or achieving a certain number of CCS projects for demonstration 
purposes. For a full analysis of the costs and benefits of different climate change options, see 
Egenhofer, Jansen, Bakker & Jussila Hammes (2006). 
38 COM(2008) 19: “Proposals for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
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Box 3. A critical analysis of the European biofuels target* 
The EU has committed itself to increasing the share of biofuels in transport from the 
current level of less than 2% to a minimum of 10% by the year 2020. This target is the subject of 
growing concern, however, as doubts about the environmental and economic efficiency of 
biofuels are increasing (e.g. House of Commons, 2008). 
There is clear evidence that the transport sector should contribute to the EU’s climate 
policy due to its continuing growth related with growing emissions. Biofuels form one part of 
the EU’s strategy to reduce emissions in this sector, but they are subject to growing criticism. 
However – apart from enhancing vehicle efficiency, which is increasingly expensive the higher 
the reduction efforts – biofuels are at present the only option for using renewable energy in the 
transport sector. For stationary applications outside of the transport sector, however, other 
renewable energy sources are available, such as solar power. 
The criticism of biofuels focuses on three main fronts. First, land use changes associated 
with increasing production of biomass for the use of renewable energy generation may speed 
up the destruction of natural habitats and lead to large amounts of carbon actually being 
released from sinks, depending on what land is substituted. Second, using food material for 
the production of bioenergy could increase food prices with negative implications especially in 
developing countries. Third, while biofuels have the potential to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, abatement potentials at a lower price are available, especially in the sectors covered 
by the ETS. 
The European Commission proposal for a Directive on renewable energy sources 
published on 23 January 2008, touches on all of these issues: The greenhouse gas balance and 
impacts on biodiversity as well as food supply problems have to be resolved by sound 
sustainability certification. However, the current proposal was criticised for failing to protect 
important ecosystems and to respond to questions of how to deal with the indirect effects of 
biofuel production and their impact on developing countries. Given that the EU Council 
subjected the biofuels target to the condition of their “production being sustainable” (European 
Council, 2007), several environmental NGOs are asking for the Directive to be improved with 
“proper safeguards” and for the suspension of the mandatory biofuels target.** German, 
British or Dutch biofuel sustainability criteria could serve as models for such safeguards. 
The questionable cost-benefit ratio of biofuels has to be discussed in a differentiated 
manner, which is reflected in another precondition mentioned by the EU Council. Large-scale 
application should be contingent on the development of so-called ‘second-generation’ biofuels, 
which can be produced from almost any form of biomass, including agricultural waste and 
non-food plants. They leave a smaller carbon footprint and perform far better in environmental 
and economic terms than conventional biofuels. Currently, their development is in its early 
pilot phase. With respect to its enormous potential in terms of yields per hectare, GHG savings 
and sustainability, additional funding during further development and deployment will be 
needed. However, it is unlikely that they will become a viable alternative in the short term. 
Filling the gap with low-performing first-generation fuels raises both sustainability concerns 
and problems with fuel quality standards. 
Given these uncertainties, a separate target for biofuels in transport seems unjustified. 
Nevertheless, technologies with high potential for sustainable bioenergy production, such as 
second-generation biofuels, should be supported and brought to the market.  
 
* See also Behrens (2008). 
** Letter of 17 environmental NGOs to the European Commission, dated 9 January 2008. ENERGY POLICY FOR EUROPE | 33 
If the deadlines for achieving targets are set on an excessively short-term basis, they 
can create rigidities, whereas long-term targets can lack credibility. Long-term targets are 
political by definition, in that they express a political ambition on the part of a generation of 
politicians. The fact that such targets tend to be ambitious and are seldom based on an 
economic analysis of the costs and benefits of different options can mean that they may turn 
out to be excessively costly. This can undermine political acceptability with the result that 
the next generation of politicians will abandon them. In extreme cases, this can result in 
‘boom-and-bust’ cycles, as observed in the field of renewables in the US. The credibility of 
targets should therefore increase as they become more realistic, i.e. achievable.39 The level of 
credibility will be exposed if progress is tracked, e.g. by the European Commission.  
One way of potentially overcoming this credibility gap while allowing for ambitious 
targets in the EU would be to formulate a set of minimum targets or obligations at EU level, 
with individual member states being free to go further if they wished.40  
Ultimately, targets can only make a difference if they are backed up by implementation 
strategies. Long-term targets provoke trade-offs (e.g. between competitiveness of industry 
and climate change targets) that need to be settled. These trade-offs are more likely to be 
addressed when the detailed implementation strategies are formulated by the EU or by 
member states.  
                                                      
39  An important additional factor accounting for the credibility of a target is whether it makes 
allowances for member state differences and preferences, e.g. resource endowment or CO2 intensity. 
40 The UK and Sweden, for example, have done precisely this in the area of climate change targets. 34 | 
 
 
8.  CASE STUDY: LONG-TERM TARGETS WITHIN AN 
EU FRAMEWORK FOR RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 
SUPPORT 
upport for renewable energy is one of the most delicate issues within the integrated EU 
climate and energy policy. Setting long-term targets (until 2020) is as important as the 
harmonisation of support schemes. Long-term targets are important to give investment 
signals for specific periods and thus enhance regulatory stability and consistency, in addition 
to providing transparency to investors. Harmonisation of (divergent) national support 
schemes among EU member states is warranted as a result of increasing levels of renewables. 
A greater percentage of power produced by renewables (RES-E) – coupled with different 
member state stimulation policies – is likely to result in distortions to Europe’s renewable 
electricity markets, essentially raising barriers to trade and affecting competition. Policy 
harmonisation is also expected to increase the stability of the electricity grid and to allow for 
economies of scale through the creation of liquid and efficient markets.  
8.1  Harmonisation and coordination of renewable support 
In a transition period, competition between national support schemes can be healthy. 
Member states exploring different options may lead to a greater variety of solutions from 
which to choose. As long as volumes remain relatively low, cross-border externalities (e.g. 
negative impacts on other member states or the EU) remain limited, unless national schemes 
erect barriers to trade or distort competition. As volumes of renewables increase, the cross-
border effects on for example competition in the power sector or grids will increase. In 
addition, there may be efficiency gains through scale effects. Over time, this will most likely 
increase the rationale for EU-wide convergence of support schemes, if not outright 
harmonisation. Based on previous analysis (e.g. Jansen et al., 2005; Egenhofer & Jansen, 
2006), we separate the entire sphere of national support-scheme frameworks into three 
distinct parts: i) level of support, ii) support-scheme models and iii) the legal framework 
including regulatory issues, and identify possible steps towards full harmonisation. A 
summary is provided in Table 2. 
Level 1: Coordination of support levels 
This basic level of coordination aims to avoid the most important distortions in member 
states’ signals for renewable projects. The level of support – direct and indirect – has a direct 
impact on decisions on whether to invest on one or the other side of a border. As EU-wide 
harmonisation of support systems does not seem a realistic prospect in the short or medium 
term, policy-makers should have a close look at the impacts of different levels of overall 
support across member states and their effects at the location around borders. It should be 
expected that reliable information on total support levels in terms of €/MWh per renewable 
generation technology will reveal whether support schemes seriously distort investment 
decisions in border areas. 
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Level 2: Harmonisation of support schemes 
Another, more difficult area is harmonisation or coordination of the different models of 
support schemes. Member states use a variety of different support schemes, which are often 
based on national preferences and policy choices. At the moment there is no consensus 
within the EU as to which of the existing models should become the blueprint of an EU-wide 
scheme, e.g. feed-in tariffs, green certificate systems, tendering systems or tax incentives. In 
addition, many renewable projects still enjoy guarantees under existing support schemes.  
Until such a consensus is feasible, stocktaking and information dissemination of best-
practice design features can be an important step. Further, it is imperative that reliable, 
standardised data are collected on aggregate support levels to promote the market uptake of 
distinct technologies in each member state. This enables policy-makers to compare the 
intensity of policy efforts on the one hand and to expose undue market distortions on the 
other, allowing for differences in national renewable resource endowments.  
In this context, a major question is whether and if so, when to link schemes that are 
based on portfolio standards and allow for trading of certificates. Economically speaking, 
making certificates tradable will increase efficiency as the target will be achieved at the least 
cost. Two caveats need to be made, however. First, some member states are still in the 
process of experimenting with their support systems. As a result, they may still be struggling 
with design issues. Linking efficient support schemes to inefficient ones may undermine the 
overall scheme. Second, it is important to consider distributional impacts of costs and 
benefits. One of the rationales behind the support of renewables has been that it would 
permit the EU to gain a competitive edge in a ‘sunrise’ technology. Politicians have used this 
argument in the past to justify support either via subsidies or by consumers under portfolio 
schemes. Under a cross-border or EU-wide portfolio model, renewable sources will be 
developed in the most suitable location (e.g. wind in Scotland). This ensures least-cost 
compliance with the target. On the other hand, this may erode support by those member 
states that due to resource endowment do not benefit from renewables investment. As a 
result, such member states will most likely only accept a modest target. Thus, while the 
overall target may be reached at least-cost, the overall (aggregate) EU target may be lower 
than it otherwise would be. This is a trade-off. 
Nevertheless, member states should be free to link their schemes, if they wish. A 
precondition for linking would be the introduction of renewable energy guarantees of origin 
(RE-GO). The preparation of harmonised RE-GO schemes should receive priority.  
Level 3: EU-wide regulatory framework for support  
The third level of harmonisation of support schemes is the creation of an EU-wide regulatory 
framework for support. While many aspects will remain within the responsibility of the 
member states (e.g. administration, permitting), the implementation of renewables support 
policy will need to be undertaken within a common EU framework. Different elements of 
this framework can be developed within different timeframes. The following tentative 
timeframe for coordinated action at the EU level is recommended for further consideration 
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Table 2. Timeframe for action 
Action  Timing of introduction 
  By 2008  Before 2010  After 2015 
Analysis of best practises of support schemes*  √    
Harmonisation of support mechanisms 
a) Total level of support in border areas   √    
b) Support schemes     √ **   
c) EU framework    √   
Removing mandatory support       √ 
Preparation of harmonised RE-GO schemes  √    
Introduction of harmonised 
RE-GO/GO schemes 
  √   
Grid integration    
a) Grid extension planning  √    
b) Coordination and information-sharing among 
regulators and TSOs  
√    
c) Harmonisation of member state grid access codes and 
standards for network equipment 
  √   
d) RES-E priority dispatch re-examination     √   
Authorisation procedures  
a) Promotion of streamlining of authorisation 
procedures based on best practice 
√    
b) Promotion of regional one-stop authorisation   √    
* This action assumes agreed data collection. 
** Given a 7-year transition period, the implementation of harmonisation decisions will fully come into operation 
by 2015 at the earliest and 2017 at the latest.  
Source: Jansen, Gialoglou & Egenhofer (2005); Egenhofer & Jansen (2006). 
Enhancing security of supply further 
From the perspective of both enhancing the security of energy supply and promoting 
sustainable development, the EU has embarked on constructive engagement with 
neighbouring countries. Neighbouring countries that are willing to fully transpose the 
Renewables Directive onto their respective national legislation, including the adoption of 
indicative targets to be agreed upon with the European Commission, should be allowed to 
share not only its obligations but also its benefits. For example, neighbouring countries with 
large endowments of RES-E (hydro, wind and sun) should be allowed to transfer RE-GOs to 
EU member states for disclosure applications. This action could provide additional revenue 
streams for, and facilitate financing of, renewable-electricity generating projects in these 
countries. This policy may apply to EEA countries (notably Norway) and to Switzerland 
(through its bilateral agreements with the EU), yet equally well in the medium term to 
countries that are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy area. | 37 
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ANNEX 1.  
Table 1. Classification of security-of-supply risks in the EU by sector – Oil, gas, coal, nuclear, renewable energy sources (RES) and electricity 
Price rise  Fuel affected  Classification Event  Disruption 
Intl. Domestic 
Probability in 
20 years 
Duration 
Oil Gas Coal  Nuclear  RES  Elec. 
Political risks 
1  Export embargo  Embargo of a specific 
exporter (e.g. Iraq) 
Little Little  Little  High Months, 
years 
x  x  – – –  – 
2 Output  reduction  Quotas on production 
to raise prices (e.g. 
OPEC cartel) 
Yes Yes  Yes  High  Months, 
years 
x  –  – – –  x 
3 Local  market 
disruption I 
By pressure groups 
(e.g. fuel price protest) 
Yes –  Yes    Medium-high  Weeks, 
months 
x  –  – – –  x 
4 Local  market 
disruption II 
Regulatory 
shortcomings (e.g. 
California power crisis, 
Nordic market) 
Yes No Yes  Medium-high  Weeks, 
months 
–  –  – – –  x 
5 International 
market disruption 
Regulatory failure (e.g. 
regulation, 
competition and 
financial markets) 
Yes Yes  (or 
rationing) 
Yes   Medium  Weeks, 
months, 
years 
x  x  – – –  x 
6  Force majeure  Civil unrest, war, 
deliberate blockage of 
trade routes 
Yes  Yes  Yes Low-medium  Variable  x  x  – – –  – 
7  Import embargo  Embargo of importing 
state by ex- port or 
transit country (e.g. 
gas cut-off ) 
Yes  No  Yes  Very low for 
EU 
Months, 
years 
x  x  – – –  – 
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Table 1, cont. 
Economic risks 
8 Public  opinion  on 
large-scale 
investment 
Delay in planning, 
under-investment 
Yes No  Yes  High  Years  x  x  x  x  x  x 
9 Supply 
discontinuity 
Lack of infrastructure  Yes  Yes  Yes  Low-medium   Months, 
years 
x x  –  –  –  x 
10 Production 
discontinuity 
Shortage of 
production capacity 
Yes Yes  Yes  Low  Years  x  x  –  –  –  x 
Environmental risks* 
11a  – Major oil spill 
(land or sea) 
No Yes  Yes  Medium  Weeks, 
months 
x –  –  –  –  – 
11b  – Major nuclear 
accident 
Yes No  Yes  Low  Months, 
years 
– –  –  x  –  x 
11c 
Accidents 
 
– Burst of major gas 
pipeline  
Yes Yes  Yes  Low  Weeks, 
months 
x x  –  –  –  x 
12a Disruption/ 
destruction of 
habitat  
– Massive biomass 
plantations;  
– Ultrasonic waves 
(of wind turbines); 
Yes No  Yes  High  Months, 
years 
– –  –  –  –  - 
12b Run-away 
greenhouse effect  
Clear indicators in 
biosphere (e.g. the 
melting of permafrost) 
Yes  No   –  Very low  Perm./ 
irreversible  
x  x  x – x  x 
Technical risks 
13 System  failure 
 
Technical failure, e.g. 
due to extreme 
weather conditions, 
technical neglect 
No No  Yes  Medium  Days,  weeks  – –  –  –  –  x 
* Environmental risks are risks to supply only in an indirect way. Risks from accidents or other environmental dangers are related to subsequent government action, which might act as a 
dampener to investment and therefore create bottlenecks. Strictly speaking, environmental risks could also be listed under political risks. 
Source: Adapted from Egenhofer & Legge (2001). | 43  
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